On July 8, Indian Chief of Defence Employees Anil Chauhan delivered a pointed message on the Observer Analysis Basis in New Delhi, elevating alarms over a budding alignment of strategic pursuits between China, Pakistan and Bangladesh.
The final cautioned that such a trilateral convergence, if it positive factors traction, might have critical implications for India’s safety and disrupt the regional steadiness of energy.
His remarks got here within the wake of a broadly circulated {photograph} from Kunming, China, exhibiting diplomats from the three nations assembly through the inaugural trilateral talks held alongside regional financial boards. Whereas the assembly was formally billed as a diplomatic engagement, the picture has despatched ripples by India’s strategic group.
Bangladesh, clearly conscious of the sensitivities concerned, has moved swiftly to include the narrative. Touhid Hossain, international affairs adviser to Dhaka’s interim authorities, publicly disavowed any intention of becoming a member of bloc-based or adversarial alliances. Dhaka reiterated that its international coverage stays firmly nonaligned and anchored in sovereign autonomy.
Regardless of these assurances, New Delhi’s strategic calculus seems to be shifting. There’s now a rising notion in New Delhi that, below the interim management of Muhammad Yunus, Bangladesh could also be recalibrating its international coverage, transferring away from the overt closeness seen below former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina. Below Hasina, India and Bangladesh loved unusually heat ties characterised by deep safety cooperation, cross-border connectivity tasks and shared regional aims. Dhaka took sturdy motion towards anti-India insurgents, gave India entry to transit routes by Bangladeshi territory and usually aligned itself with New Delhi’s strategic priorities.
Whether or not actual or perceived, this shift is influencing how India reads the regional panorama.
Chauhan additionally drew consideration to a broader, troubling sample: Exterior powers – mainly China – are leveraging financial fragilities throughout the Indian Ocean area to deepen their affect. With international locations corresponding to Sri Lanka and Pakistan more and more beholden to Chinese language funding and support, considerations are mounting that Beijing is systematically encircling India by soft-power entrenchment.
Bangladesh’s case, nonetheless, stays considerably distinctive. Its financial system, although below stress, is comparatively resilient, and Dhaka continues to stress pragmatic, interest-driven diplomacy over ideological alignment. The Kunming assembly, whereas symbolically charged, doesn’t but characterize a proper strategic realignment.
Nonetheless, the formation of a trilateral framework marks a major growth. In contrast to earlier bilateral engagements, this format introduces a brand new dimension of coordination that might evolve in unpredictable methods.
The echoes of historical past are arduous to disregard. Within the Sixties, China and Pakistan maintained a decent strategic axis that tacitly encompassed East Pakistan – what’s now Bangladesh. That configuration unravelled in 1971 with Bangladesh’s independence.
Right now, nonetheless, delicate indicators recommend parts of that strategic triad could also be resurfacing – this time in a extra advanced geopolitical theatre.
For Beijing, deepening ties with each Pakistan and Bangladesh serves its broader goal of consolidating affect in South Asia and the Indian Ocean area. For Islamabad, it offers a layer of diplomatic insulation and strategic leverage. For Dhaka, the connection is extra tactical – an try and hedge towards regional volatility at a time when its once-stable ties with New Delhi seem more and more unsure.
Bangladesh’s cautious posture can also be formed by risky home politics. For the reason that July protests and the set up of an interim administration, inner cohesion has frayed. Polarisation is resurging, and with nationwide elections looming in early 2026, the federal government’s precedence is stability, not technique. Overseas coverage on this local weather is reactive – not transformative.
Dhaka understands the dangers of leaning too far in any path. Lingering historic resentments with Pakistan stay politically delicate whereas an overreliance on China would pressure essential commerce and diplomatic ties with the West, particularly the USA, the place considerations over democratic backsliding and human rights have sharpened.
On this context, any overt strategic alignment might invite pointless scrutiny and backlash.
The Kunming assembly, regardless of its symbolism, was primarily financial in focus – referring to commerce, connectivity, infrastructure and cultural cooperation. Nevertheless, when China and Pakistan floated the proposal to institutionalise trilateral cooperation by a joint working group, Bangladesh demurred. This was not indecision. It was a deliberate, calculated refusal.
Dhaka’s international coverage has lengthy been outlined by “engagement with out entanglement”. It maintains open channels with all main powers whereas avoiding the traps of bloc politics. This nonaligned posture is a core precept guiding its diplomacy. Bangladesh welcomes dialogue and financial cooperation, nevertheless it attracts a agency line at navy or strategic alignment.
For India, deciphering Bangladesh’s strikes requires nuance. Whereas Dhaka continues to broaden its worldwide partnerships, it has not deserted its important position in India’s safety calculus, significantly within the northeastern area. The problem for New Delhi is not only to watch rising partnerships however to bolster the worth of its personal.
All through the 2000s and 2010s, safety cooperation between New Delhi and Dhaka below Hasina’s Awami League was pivotal in stabilising the border area. Bangladesh’s decisive crackdown on militant teams, coupled with shut coordination with Indian intelligence and safety companies, performed a vital position in suppressing rebel threats.
Right now, with India’s ties to each China and Pakistan below extreme pressure, any perceived shift in Dhaka’s stance is scrutinised intensely in New Delhi. The worry that Beijing and Islamabad would possibly exploit Bangladesh as a strategic lever to use uneven stress stays deeply ingrained in India’s safety mindset.
But, Bangladesh’s express rejection of the proposed trilateral working group reveals a clear-eyed understanding of those sensitivities. It underscores Dhaka’s intent to keep away from actions that might escalate regional tensions.
This evolving dynamic poses a twin problem for India: It calls for a recalibrated response that strikes past reactive defensiveness. New Delhi should embrace a extra subtle, forward-looking technique – one which transcends outdated political loyalties and adapts to the shifting diplomatic contours of South Asia.
The views expressed on this article are the writer’s personal and don’t essentially replicate Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.